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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Third Circuit held in United States v. Hull that the 
offense of possessing a pipe bomb,1 in itself, did not constitute a crime of 
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 1 A pipe bomb is “a small, homemade bomb typically contained in a metal pipe.” 
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1007 (2d ed. 2000). Defendant was convicted of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A), which defines a pipe bomb as a destructive device, 
which is further defined in part as “any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb.” 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (2006). The terms “pipe bomb” and “destructive device” are used 
interchangeably within this comment. 
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violence.2 Basing its holding on the definition of a crime of violence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, the court reasoned that possession alone of a 
pipe bomb does not create a substantial risk that physical force may be 
used against another person or another’s property.3 Furthermore, the 
Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding that the minimum 
level of criminal intent for a crime of violence must be greater than 
negligence.4 Because possession does not require “active employment” 
and because there was no substantial risk that physical force might be 
used against another person or property, the Third Circuit reversed the 
conviction for this charge.5 
The core of the Third Circuit’s reasoning stemmed from the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Leocal v. Ashcroft.6 That case resolved a 
previous split among the circuits with respect to the requisite level of 
culpability needed for a crime of violence.7 The specific facts of the case 
concerned serious bodily injuries resulting from driving under the 
influence of alcohol or other substances (DUI).8 The Court held that 
accidents resulting from driving under the influence cannot qualify as 
crimes of violence as per § 16.9 Offenses that “either do not have a mens 
rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the operation 
of a vehicle” do not rise to the level of a crime of violence.10  In addition, 
the Court determined that a categorical approach must be applied to 
properly define such crimes.11 
While this holding resolved a previous circuit split, it intentionally 
declined to address the precise threshold of intent needed for a crime of 
violence.12 After Leocal, negligence is not sufficient, but what about 
recklessness? In Hull, the Third Circuit seems to have given the Supreme 
Court’s refusal much weight by holding that possession of a destructive 
device does not meet the sufficient level of intent.13 
This comment disagrees with the Third Circuit and argues that the 
possession of a pipe bomb, or other similar destructive devices, which 
                                                                                                             
 2 456 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 3 Id. at 144. 
 4 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 5 Id. at 6. 
 6 Hull, 456 F.3d at 138. 
 7 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 6. 
 8 Id. at 3. 
 9 Id. at 13. 
 10 Id. at 6. 
 11 Id. at 7. 
 12 The Court concluded, “This case does not present us with the question whether a 
state or federal offense that requires proof of the reckless use of force against a person or 
property of another qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.” Id. at 13. 
 13 United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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serve neither a legitimate nor a non-violent purpose, qualify as a crime of 
violence. Crimes of violence under § 16 do not require as much 
culpability as the Third Circuit majority held.14 Under Leocal, destructive 
devices, such as pipe bombs, can be neatly classified into their own 
category, separate from the broader category of “firearms.” In this 
narrow category, the risk of death and destruction inherent in the simple 
possession of a pipe bomb is, “by its nature,” a crime of violence.15 
Section 16 does not require an act of violence before declaring a crime 
“violent,” and Leocal does not preclude the mens rea of recklessness. 
This comment addresses these issues through the following order. 
Part I provides the various definitions of a “crime of violence” to serve 
as a backdrop for the reasoning behind the Hull and Leocal decisions. 
Such understanding will clarify just how the possession of a pipe bomb 
can result in a crime of violence within an expanded interpretation of 
Leocal. Part II then extrapolates the smaller category of destructive 
devices from the larger class of firearms. Not all firearms present either a 
legitimate or non-violent use; thus, not all firearms should be similarly 
categorized in a § 16 analysis. It shall be shown that this distinction is 
consistent with Leocal’s categorical approach, which in turn would lead 
the Hull Court down an alternate path. Part III contends that recklessness 
is a sufficient mens rea for a crime of violence. After the Leocal holding 
made clear that negligence will not suffice as such, it expressly left open 
the issue of recklessness. And on the spectrum of culpability, according 
to the Model Penal Code, recklessness falls closer to intentional acts than 
does negligence. It follows, then, that recklessness can function as a 
sufficient mens rea for a crime of violence in accordance with Leocal. 
Finally, this comment brings to light the future implications that could 
result from Hull’s narrow interpretation of § 16. 
I. VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE: LEOCAL V. 
ASHCROFT AND UNITED STATES V. HULL 
Both § 16 and the Sentencing Guidelines provide a definition of a 
crime of violence. Depending on the particular language or silence of an 
offense, either definition could control.16 The Supreme Court in Leocal 
was faced with silent language from the underlying offense and 
concluded that § 16’s definition of a crime of violence applied.17 Section 
16 requires a higher level of culpability than the Guidelines.18 The Third 
                                                                                                             
 14 Id. at 144 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
 15 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
 16 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 6. 
 17 Id. at 6-7. 
 18 Id. 
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Circuit followed in suit and applied § 16’s definition in the Hull case.19 A 
cursory explanation of how these definitions relate helps to explain the 
result of these particular case decisions. 
A. Section 16 as Compared to the Sentencing Guidelines 
This comment focuses specifically on 18 U.S.C. § 16, which served 
as the controlling statute in Leocal and Hull. Section 16 defines a crime 
of violence as: 
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of 
another, or 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person 
or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.20 
Section 16 lies within the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.21 
With this Act, Congress created the United States Sentencing 
Commission and gave it the authority to create sentencing guidelines.22 
Congress included instructions for the Commission to follow, one of 
which included the requirement that repeat offenders of a crime of 
violence receive greater sentences due to the offenders’ recidivism.23 
Because this portion of the Act failed to define the phrase “crime of 
violence,” the Court reasoned that § 16 was intended by Congress to 
supply the definition.24 The § 16 definition remained the applicable 
definition until 1989 when the Sentencing Commission amended the 
guidelines and altered the definition of a crime of violence to its present 
form.25 
                                                                                                             
 19 Hull, 456 F.3d at 138. 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
 21 Specifically, § 16 is found in Chapter X of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2136 (1984). 
 22 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006). 
 23 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines 
specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for 
categories of defendants in which the defendant . . . (1) has been convicted of a felony 
that is (A) a crime of violence. . . .”). 
 24 Id. According to the legislative history, the definition of crimes of violence 
contained in § 16 was meant to apply throughout the entire Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 6 (2004) (describing the numerous 
places where the phrase “crime of violence” is used throughout the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act). 
 25 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2006) (“The term ‘crime 
of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment 
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For the purposes of this comment, the amended definition’s most 
significant aspect is the requisite level of intent. Both the old and new 
definitions remain consistent with respect to prong one–they both require 
a purposeful intent to use, attempt, or threaten to use physical force 
against another person.26 However, the two definitions part ways in their 
respective second prongs.27 Section 16(b) refers to the “use of force,” 
while the guidelines now require “conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another person.”28 This distinction 
changes the level of culpability to a lesser mens rea of “pure” 
recklessness for purposes of the guidelines.29 Under the guidelines, a 
crime of violence will include an offense where the offender may lack 
the intent to use force, but the underlying conduct involves a serious risk 
of physical injury.30 A similar crime would not suffice under § 16(b).31 It 
is important to understand this background because the underlying 
statute for a crime of violence may refer to either definition or may 
remain silent. 
B. Leocal Resolves a Previous Circuit Split 
Before Leocal v. Ashcroft, a circuit split had existed as to “whether 
state DUI [driving under the influence] offenses . . . which either do not 
have a mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in 
the operation of a vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence.”32 The circuit 
split resulted from the fact that several states had criminalized a “DUI 
causing serious bodily injury or death without requiring proof of any 
                                                                                                             
for a term exceeding one year, that–(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a 
dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”). 
 26 “Use of physical force is an intentional act, and therefore the first prong of both 
definitions requires specific intent to use force.” United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 
866 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 27 The distinction is so clear that the Fifth Circuit has held that “§ 16 and § 4B1.2(a) 
are different, and that what qualifies as a crime of violence under one does not 
necessarily qualify under the other. To the extent that our prior cases have conflated the § 
16(b) and § 4B1.2(a)(2) definitions of ‘crime of violence,’ they are overruled.”  United 
States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 28 Id. (“[Section] 16(b) focuses on a risk of physical force, whereas § 4B1.2(a)(2) 
focuses on a risk of physical injury; § 16(b) requires a ‘substantial risk,’ whereas § 
4B1.2(a) requires a ‘serious potential risk’; and § 16(b) focuses on the ‘nature’ of the 
felony, whereas § 4B1.2(a)(2) focuses on ‘conduct.’”). 
 29 Parson, 955 F.2d at 866. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 543 U.S. 1, 6 (2004). 
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mental state.”33 With respect to defining a crime of violence, the Court in 
Leocal held that where § 16’s definition controls, negligence stands as an 
insufficient level of intent for a crime of violence.34 In Leocal, the 
petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol that 
caused an accident seriously injuring two people.35 The applicable statute 
instructed the courts to apply § 16’s definition of a “crime of violence,”36 
and thus, the guideline’s definition did not apply in Leocal. 
The Court held that a categorical approach must be applied in 
determining whether a crime is a “crime of violence.”37 The language of 
§ 16 speaks to the underlying offense and a categorical approach looks 
“to the elements and nature of the offense, rather than to the particular 
facts relating to petitioner’s crime.”38 Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that such offenses could not qualify as 
crimes of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because the statute 
requires “a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or negligent 
conduct involved in a DUI offense.”39 The specific language of § 16(a) 
requires active employment.  The Court’s previous decision in Bailey v. 
United States40 defined “use” to mean active employment, which is more 
than accidental or negligent conduct. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, 
“[w]hile one may, in theory, actively employ something in an accidental 
manner, it is much less natural to say that a person actively employs 
physical force against another person by accident.”41 
With respect to the broader language of § 16(b), the Court 
concluded that the petitioner’s offense did not qualify as a crime of 
                                                                                                             
 33 Id. at 8. 
 34 Id. at 11. 
 35 Id. at 3. 
 36 “Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony . . . is deportable.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). The statute defines an “aggravated felony” as inclusive of a 
“crime of violence” defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. Id. 
 37 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7. 
 38 Id. Many cases pre-Leocal held that a categorical approach must be applied to 
analyze a § 16 crime of violence. See e.g., Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“Under a categorical approach, we look to the generic elements of the statutory 
offense . . . . [This approach is] ‘consistent with both precedent and sound policy . . . .’ 
Section 16(b) itself defines a crime of violence ‘by its nature’ . . . [and] ‘compels’ a 
reviewing court to focus ‘on the intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual 
circumstances surrounding any particular violation.’”); United States v. Medina-
Anicacio, 325 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying a categorical approach regardless of the 
actual underlying facts of the case); United States v. Chapra-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 
(5th Cir. 2001) (finding that the language, “by its nature,” of § 16(b) compels the court 
“to employ a categorical approach when determining whether an offense is a crime of 
violence”). 
 39 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. 
 40 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
 41 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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violence because “section 16(b) does not . . . encompass all negligent 
misconduct . . . [i]t simply covers offenses that naturally involve a person 
acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against 
another in committing an offense.”42 The Court concluded that the 
petitioner could not have committed a crime of violence through his 
negligent conduct. However, the Court left open the question whether an 
“offense that requires proof of reckless use of force against a person or 
property of another qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 
16.”43 
C. The Hull Case 
The following case was the catalyst for composing this comment. 
The Hull case reasoned that mere possession of a pipe bomb is not a 
crime of violence.44 As will follow, this comment attempts to raise the 
errors from this holding. 
1. The Majority Applies § 16 and Leocal 
That final quote mentioned above from Leocal has contributed to 
inconsistencies among the circuits applying the Court’s holding.45 The 
Third Circuit’s 2006 decision in Hull v. United States serves as the 
starkest example.46  In a matter of first impression, the Third Circuit 
applied Leocal’s categorical approach to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
842(p), a statute “applied only sparingly across the country.”47 Section 
842(p) is another example of a silent statute in that it neither defines 
“crime of violence” nor specifically refers a court to other provisions.48 
Nevertheless, the court applied § 16’s definition and held that simply 
possessing a pipe bomb was not a crime of violence, because there was 
not a substantial risk that physical force would be used to carry out the 
offense of possession.49 
An understanding of this decision requires a brief overview of the 
facts. David Wayne Hull was indicted for, inter alia, violations of 18 
                                                                                                             
 42 Id. at 10. 
 43 Id. at 13. 
 44 Hull v. United States, 456 F.3d 133 (3d. Cir. 2006). 
 45 The Third Circuit in Hull parted ways from other circuits that held possession of a 
pipe bomb was a crime of violence. See United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 
1999); see also United States v. Newman, No. 97-1294, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27000 
(10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997). 
 46 Hull, 456 F.3d 133. 
 47 Id. at 138. 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) (2006). 
 49 Hull, 456 F.3d at 141. 
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U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A).50 Section 842(p) makes it “unlawful for any 
person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive [or] a 
destructive device, . . . with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or 
information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a 
Federal crime of violence.”51 Hull had provided a government informant 
with information and instructions on how to assemble a pipe bomb.52 The 
indictment for his offense stated that the underlying federal crime of 
violence was “solely the ‘unlawful possession of a pipe bomb.’”53 
Although § 842(p) does not specifically direct a court to § 16, the Third 
Circuit nevertheless applied § 16’s definition of crime of violence and 
not the sentencing guidelines.54 
The Third Circuit limited its analysis to the second prong of § 16, 
because the “government [did] not allege that possession of a pipe bomb 
involve[d] the actual use of physical force, only that it involve[d] a 
substantial risk of physical force against another.”55 Thus, the court had 
only to determine whether simply “possessing” a pipe bomb is an 
“offense that naturally involves a person acting in disregard of the risk 
that physical force might be used against another in committing the 
offense.”56 The court explained that it was irrelevant to inquire whether 
or not a violent crime will be committed as a result of possession.57 
Instead, the issue was confined to “whether there [was] a risk that in 
committing the offense of possession, force will be used.”58 As instructed 
by Leocal, the Third Circuit applied a categorical approach to the nature 
of the offense and held that it does not create such a risk.59 
The court concluded that it was not the possession of a pipe bomb 
which creates a danger, but rather it is the “use” of that pipe bomb.60 The 
                                                                                                             
 50 Id. at 137. 
 51 18 U.S.C § 842(p) (2006). 
 52 Section 842(p) defines “destructive device,” “explosive,” and “weapon of mass 
destruction” by referring to other sections throughout the Code. 18 U.S.C § 842(p) 
(2006). A pipe bomb neatly falls within the first two categories. 
 53 Hull, 456 F.3d at 137. 
 54 Id. at 138. It is not especially clear why the court chose this route. The court states 
that it was instructed to do so because of Leocal. In a footnote in Leocal, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist referred to § 842(p) as a statute that employs a crime of violence. Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (2004). The government in Hull argued to apply the guideline 
definition, but the Third Circuit stated that Leocal “explicitly rejected using [the 
guidelines] to interpret § 16 (and by extension, § 842(p)).” Hull, 456 F.3d at 141 (citing 
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 n.7). 
 55 Hull, 456 F.3d at 138. 
 56 Id. (citing Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10). 
 57 Hull, 456 F.3d at 140. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 139. 
 60 Id. 
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court applied the definition of “use,” as determined by Bailey and 
Leocal, which required active employment.61 This definition is opposed 
to “possession,” which seems to connote an exercise of control or 
dominion over the object.62 The court posited that if Hull’s indictment 
had charged him with the use of a pipe bomb, then there would be a risk 
of physical force being actively employed.63 “There is no risk that 
physical force might be used against another to commit the offense of 
possession, regardless of whether pipe bombs have a legitimate purpose 
or not.”64 Finally, the court reasoned that even though a pipe bomb could 
unexpectedly detonate, the risk of explosion would not be the result “of 
any intentional use of force.”65 
2. The Hull Dissent 
Senior District Judge Ackerman, sitting by designation, applied a 
broader interpretation of § 16(b) and concluded that, because a pipe 
bomb has no legitimate use, any possession thereof results in a 
substantial risk of physical force.66 Judge Ackerman’s response did not 
contradict the holding from Leocal, in part, because it did not advocate 
strict liability.67 Instead, Judge Ackerman’s dissent puts the possession of 
a pipe bomb into a category of its own; therefore, possession alone was a 
conscious disregard for the risks inherent in such a destructive device.68 
This level of intent—recklessness—currently remains a possible 
candidate for a crime of violence under § 16(b).69 
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ackerman articulated two main 
points. First, applying the methods of statutory interpretation, Judge 
Ackerman concluded that the plain language of § 16(b) does not require 
the actual use of physical force.70 Section 16(b) states that a “substantial 
risk” of physical force “may be used.”71 The qualifying language of 
“may” negates the requirement of actual physical force.72 In addition, 
                                                                                                             
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 141. 
 64 Id. at 139. 
 65 Id. at 140. 
 66 Id. at 145 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 146-47. 
 68 Id. at 147. 
 69 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004). 
 70 Hull, 456 F.3d at 144 (Ackerman, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Dodge, 
846 F. Supp. 181, 183 (D. Conn. 1994) (“Actual use of physical force against another is 
not an essential element of a ‘crime of violence’ . . . as evidenced by the use of the 
conditional term ‘may.’” (alteration in original)). 
 71 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006). 
 72 Hull, 456 F.3d at 144 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Ackerman noted that “substantial risk” is a term “difficult to 
quantify with precision” and as a result, courts should apply “common 
sense and ordinary usage” to fill in this gap.73 Under a narrower 
categorical approach, possessing a pipe bomb, by its nature, has a degree 
of risk substantial enough to satisfy the definition of a crime of 
violence.74 Because the risk of force must be in the nature of the offense, 
and such a risk is inherent in a pipe bomb, the use of actual force is not 
required.75 
Second, Judge Ackerman’s dissent identified that § 16(b) requires 
that this risk arise during “the course of committing the offense.”76 The 
crime of possession is a continuing offense; the court must look at the 
full course of possession, not just the initial act of obtaining control.77 In 
support of this view, Judge Ackerman deconstructed the phrase “in the 
course of committing the offense.”78 For example, the dissent stated, 
“‘[c]ommitting’ connotes present, continuing action.”79 “‘[I]n the course 
of’ suggests, not merely a passing instant, but a continuum of time . . . 
.”80 Finally, “the offense” portion of the phrase refers to the entire 
offense “and not merely a portion or an aspect of a given offense.”81 
Collectively, this analysis “requires a court to consider the entire period 
during which it can be said the offense is being committed”;82 the entire 
time an individual possesses a pipe bomb. 
The dissent also criticized the majority for distorting § 16(b) and 
applying such a narrow interpretation.83 Judge Ackerman noted that the 
majority substituted the phrase “to commit the offense” with “in the 
course of committing the offense.”84 From that standpoint, it could be 
conceded that once possession of a bomb was obtained, the crime is 
completed with no future risks thereafter. However, the dissent strongly 
disagreed with that interpretation: “The majority considers only the risk 
incident to effectuating the offense, not the risk that may occur during 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. (“The “terms ‘substantial risk’ and ‘may’ make clear that the actual use of 
physical force is not a required element of a crime of violence.”); see United States v. 
Dillard, 214 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795 (5th 
Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Dodge, 846 F. Supp. 181 (D. Conn. 1994). 
 74 Hull, 456 F.3d at 144 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. 
 76 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006). 
 77 Id. at 145; see discussion infra Part II. 
 78 Hull, 456 F.3d at 145 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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the continuing offense.”85 The crime of possession is not a simple snap-
shot in time and does not cease until possession is relinquished.86 Thus, 
Judge Ackerman determined that there is a substantial risk that force may 
be used at any time a bomb is in possession.87 
Judge Ackerman concluded his dissent in the same footing as this 
comment begins: “If the ‘mere’ possession of a pipe bomb is not a crime 
of violence, then neither, it would seem, is ‘mere’ possession of an even 
more destructive implement.”88 Judge Ackerman could not endorse “such 
a crabbed interpretation of § 16(b)” that would allow these devices to be 
dismissed of any substantial risk that physical force may be used.89 In the 
course of possessing a pipe bomb, or any similarly categorized 
destructive device, there is always a substantial risk that physical force 
may be used, and the plain language of § 16(b) supports such an 
interpretation.90 
II. CLASSIFYING THE POSSESSION OF A PIPE BOMB IN ITS OWN 
CATEGORY 
A distinction exists between the risks of physical force involved in 
completing the offense of possessing a pipe bomb and the crime of 
driving under the influence (“DUI”) as posed in Leocal. By its very 
nature, a DUI does not create a risk that force will be used; instead, a 
DUI is negligent conduct, which Leocal held cannot be a crime of 
violence.91 Because cars naturally have various legitimate uses, there 
must be some extrinsic intent to use the car in a forceful manner to cause 
harm to be a crime of violence.92 In contrast, the offense of possessing a 
bomb, by its very nature, involves a conscious disregard for the risk of 
force. This is because there is no legitimate, non-violent purpose for 
possessing such a bomb. Therefore, an additional desire of intent to 
cause harm is not needed; it is encapsulated in the nature of possessing 
the bomb.93 
                                                                                                             
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 146. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 150. 
 89 Id. 
 90 The phrase “may be used” is the critical difference here. Under the categorical 
approach, the nature of the offense is the possession of a bomb. Id. at 145. The possession 
of a bomb serves only one purpose: to be used against a person or the property of another. 
Id. at 148. 
 91 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). 
 92 Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 93 Hull, 456 F.3d at 147 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
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The majority in Hull applied a narrow reading of the Leocal case in 
its interpretation of § 16(b).94 A broader reading leads to the conclusion 
that the nature of the offense, possession of a pipe bomb, is a crime of 
violence, and this characterization is logically consistent with Leocal.95 It 
seems that the Third Circuit in Hull grouped all firearms into one 
category and then began its analysis. Neither § 16(b) nor Leocal 
specifically require this grouping. The larger category of firearms 
contains various artillery, which are not inherently dangerous or do not 
pose substantial risks of force being used to complete the crime of 
possession. Similarly, as in Leocal, driving while intoxicated does not 
pose a risk that physical force will be used to complete such an offense.96 
In contrast, the possession of a pipe bomb, by its nature, entails this 
substantial risk of physical force. Because possession of a pipe bomb 
serves no legitimate, non-violent purpose and because recklessness 
conduct is not precluded as a level of culpability, this comment argues 
that mere possession of any destructive device must constitute a crime of 
violence. To avoid any confusion, this comment first distinguishes “use” 
from “possession” so as not to conflate the terms as warned by the Hull 
majority.97 
A. Distinguishing Use from Possession 
In Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court distinguished 
between “possession” and “use.”98 Bailey involved both the use and 
possession of a firearm during a drug exchange.99 The defendants were 
charged with using a firearm located in either a footlocker or the trunk of 
a car.100 The Court disagreed with the charges and held that the firearms 
could not have been “used” because they were not actively employed in 
the commission of the drug trafficking charges.101 The Court clarified the 
meaning of “use” as it pertained to the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1).102 The term “use” requires the need for active employment, 
while “possession” does not.103 Justice O’Connor described the paradox 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. at 145. 
 95 Id. at 145-46. 
 96 Leocal v Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
 97 Hull, 456 F.3d at 140. 
 98 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
 99 Id. at 138. 
 100 Id. at 138-40. 
 101 Id. at 144. 
 102 Section 924(c)(1) defines the offense of using or carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). 
 103 The Court asked, “What must the Government show, beyond mere possession, to 
establish ‘use’ for the purposes of [this case]? We conclude that . . . the Government must 
show active employment . . . .” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144. 
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with the statement, “I use a gun to protect my home but I never had to 
use it.”104 This example represents the latter form of “use” that requires 
active employment of a gun. 
It may seem that Bailey answers the crime of violence inquiry 
because “possession” is only the exercise of control over an item and 
“use” is the active employment of that item. Yet the Bailey court did not 
have the “occasion to consider what sort of conduct involves a 
substantial risk that physical force may be used against a person or 
property.”105 In defining possession of a pipe bomb in its own category, it 
can be seen that this crime does “involve a substantial risk that force 
against another may be ‘actively employed’ in the course of committing 
the offense of possession.”106 Therefore, possessing a pipe bomb does not 
overstep the boundaries dividing possession from use. 
Moreover, in United States v. Jennings, the Fifth Circuit addressed 
the distinction between possession and use in the context of a pipe 
bomb.107 Jennings dealt with the same issue as Hull except that the 
conviction was based on a violation of § 924(c), the same statute at issue 
in Bailey, which defined “crime of violence” similarly to 18 U.S.C. § 
16.108 The Jennings court held that the possession of a pipe bomb did 
constitute a crime of violence.109 After applying a categorical 
approach,110 as Leocal later prescribed,111 the court explained that a 
“crime of violence” did not need to actually involve violence, but rather 
“create a substantial risk of the possible use of force.”112 
In Hull, the majority dismissed this argument on the grounds that 
the Jennings Court conflated “use” and “possession” as prohibited by 
Leocal.113 However, the Hull Court was too rushed in reaching this 
conclusion and analyzed two separate sentences as one: “We hold that 
                                                                                                             
 104 Id. at 143. 
 105 Hull, 456 F.3d at 149. 
 106 Id. 
 107 195 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999). This case is pre-Leocal; however, it applies the same 
analysis of a categorical approach and applying language similar to § 16(b)’s definition 
of a crime of violence. 
 108 Section 924(c)(3) defines a crime of violence as one “that by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used 
in the course of committing the offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (2006). This language is 
virtually identical to § 16(b). 
 109 Jennings, 195 F.3d at 799. “[T]he primary reason that unregistered possession of 
[pipe bombs] is a crime is the virtual inevitability that such possession will result in 
violence.” Id. 
 110 Id. at 797. 
 111 Leocal v. United States, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004). 
 112 Jennings, 195 F.3d at 798 (citing United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1099 (5th 
Cir. 1991)). 
 113 United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2006). 
630 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:617 
possession of an unregistered pipe bomb, by its very nature, creates a 
substantial risk of violence,” with “[i]n fact, we cannot conceive of any 
non-violent or lawful uses for a pipe bomb.”114 The latter statement 
serves only as a subordinate point to emphasize the lack of social 
purpose. Under this reasoning, conflation does not exist, and the 
Jennings holding should have served as persuasive precedent in this 
debate. 
B. Possession is a Continuing Offense 
The strongest support for the argument that the possession of a pipe 
bomb constitutes a crime of violence stems from possession’s nature as a 
continuing offense. It follows that, because possession presents a 
substantial risk that force will be used, this risk must be considered 
present during the entire scope of the possession. This contention helps 
ascribe possession of a pipe bomb to its own category. Also, this 
contention does not go against Bailey’s distinction between “use” and 
“possession.”115 
Several pre-Leocal decisions consider the full nature of the 
continuing offense of possession and numerous courts of appeals cases 
have recognized that certain crimes of possession may qualify as crimes 
of violence, as this comment immediately discusses.  Although the first 
case, United States v. Luster, did not involve a crime of violence under § 
16, it accentuates the point that possession is a continuing offense.116  In 
Luster, a prisoner escaped from prison, and the court defined this 
conduct as a continuing crime.117 “Escape is a continuing crime; it does 
not end when the escapee completes the act of leaving a correctional 
facility. Rather, the escapee must continue to evade police and avoid 
capture.”118 The Third Circuit cited its sister circuit case noting that 
an escapee “is likely to possess a variety of supercharged 
emotions, and in evading those trying to recapture him, may feel 
threatened by police officers, ordinary citizens, or even fellow 
escapees. Consequently violence could erupt at any time.” Thus, 
“every escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not 
explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at 
                                                                                                             
 114 Jennings, 195 F.3d at 798. 
 115 Hull, 456 F.3d at 149 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
 116 305 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 117 Id. at  202. 
 118 Id. 
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any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do 
so.119 
Next, in United States v. Zidell, the defendant was charged with drug 
possession and the intent to distribute while traveling through different 
states.120 The court held that, because the possession of drugs is a 
continuing offense, “‘venue is proper in any district along the way.’”121 
Also, in United States v. Fleischli, the court held that the “[p]ossession of 
a firearm is a continuing offense which ceases only when the possession 
stops.”122 Another court was faced with the issue of constructive 
possession of a firearm in United States v. Jones.123 That court noted that 
“possession . . . refer[s] to a course of conduct rather than individual acts 
of dominion.”124 Thus, “the continuous possession of the same firearm 
constitutes a single offense.”125 Finally, the dissent in United States v. 
Hull cited to an example where it stated that “‘[b]ecause possession is a 
continuing offense, there is ordinarily no single act which can be used to 
establish the defendant’s guilt. There is, rather, a continuum of time 
during which the defendant possessed the weapon.’”126 
When viewing the underlying offense of possession, courts should 
view the entire crime from acquisition to relinquishment. The Leocal 
holding does not prohibit courts from considering entire course of a 
continuing offense.127 When considering the substantial risk of force to 
be used in possessing a pipe bomb in its own category, there is no reason 
to conclude that the offense is not a crime of violence. 
C. Pipe Bombs versus Other Firearms 
Through the analyses of the previous cases, it has been established 
that the offense of possession is a continuing offense. And when 
applying Leocal, the categorical approach requires an investigative eye 
into the nature of the offense. Possession of a pipe bomb, or any 
destructive device for that matter, encompasses a substantial risk that the 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id. (quoting United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
Nothing resembles a “powder keg” ready to explode more than a pipe bomb. 
 120 323 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 121 Id. at 422 (quoting United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 226 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 122 305 F.3d 643, 658 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Ballentine, 4 F.3d 504, 
507 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 123 403 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 124 Id. at 606. 
 125 Id. 
 126 456 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 2006) (Ackerman, J., dissenting) (citing William 
Meyerhofer, Statutory Restrictions on Weapons Possession: Must the Right to Self-
Defense Fall Victim?, 1996 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 219, 233 (1996)). 
 127 Id. at 147. 
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possessor may use force because a there is neither a legitimate nor a non-
violent purpose.128 
In contrast to guns and other common firearms, pipe bombs contain 
a substantial risk that the possessor may put that bomb to an illegitimate 
and violent use.129 Guns and rifles, although violent, still may have many 
legitimate uses such as hunting, sport, target practice, and self-defense. 
However, possessing a pipe bomb is both illegal and violent. A pipe 
bomb has no conceivable non-violent or lawful use.130 Because the 
purpose of a pipe bomb cannot fluctuate, it is inherently dangerous and 
should not be grouped with other firearms.131 
This distinction is also consistent with the view that Congress and 
law enforcement agencies have towards other destructive devices similar 
to pipe bombs. In United States v. Cruz,132 a case involving Molotov 
cocktails,133 the court held that this cocktail constituted a destructive 
device as defined by the Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f).134 The court 
reasoned that because the Firearms Act requires the registration of 
“objectively destructive devices, devices inherently prone to abuse and 
for which there are no legitimate industrial uses. The Act thus clearly 
encompasses Molotov cocktails, since they have no use besides 
destruction.”135 This reasoning applies, a fortiori, to pipe bombs. 
                                                                                                             
 128 Id. at 144. 
 129 “It flows inexorably from this conclusion that when a person unlawfully possesses 
a pipe bomb, there is a substantial risk that he or she may put that pipe bomb to the use 
for which it was intended: to perpetrate physical force against the person or property of 
another.” Id. at 148-49 (Ackerman, J., dissenting). 
 130 Courts have held that a pipe bomb has no legitimate use. See United States v. 
Jennings, 195 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Newman, No. 97-1294, 97-1295, 
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27000 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997); United States v. Cole, No. 93-
1344, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3876 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 1994). Furthermore, pipe bombs are 
too destructive for any productive use in farming. See Hull, 456 F.3d at 148 (Ackerman, 
J. dissenting). 
 131 The use of the term “inherently dangerous” should not suggest that the possessor is 
strictly liable for a crime of violence. However, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Leocal, the possession of this inherently dangerous device is a reckless 
disregard to the risk inherent in possessing it. See United States v. Newman, 125 F.3d 
863, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33909 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dodge, 846 F. 
Supp. 181 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding that pipe bombs are inherently dangerous weapons 
and, by their very nature, there is a substantial risk that force may be used against 
another). 
 132 492 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 133 “A ‘Molotov cocktail’ is defined as a ‘crude hand grenade made of a bottle filled 
with a flammable liquid (as gasoline) and fitted with a wick or saturated rag taped to the 
bottom and ignited at the moment of hurling.’” Id. at 218 n.1 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1456 (3d ed. 1961)). 
 134 Id. at 219. 
 135 Id. 
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In United States v. Williams,136 the defendant was charged with 
selling an unregistered firearm.137 The defendant contested that he was 
unaware of the fact that the firearm had been converted from a legal, 
registered, semi-automatic weapon into an unregistered, fully-automatic 
weapon, which was illegal under the statute.138 The converted firearm 
had no external modifications on the weapon to indicate that it needed to 
be registered.139 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the statute as requiring that 
the government prove “[the] defendants knew that a ‘firearm’ as 
legislatively defined was being transferred.”140 However, a later Sixth 
Circuit case involving a pipe bomb departed from this reasoning.141 A 
pipe bomb is a device “of a type that would place a person on notice that 
it is likely to be regulated.”142 “Pipe bombs are inherently dangerous and 
serve no useful purpose. [Here t]he pipe bomb defendant was accused of 
possessing had been used to bomb a van and was obviously intended as a 
weapon and not for sport.”143 The court recognized the distinction 
between natural risks involved in possessing a pipe bomb versus a 
firearm that could be put towards legitimate, non-violent uses.144 
Another case distinguishing the illegitimate and non-violent use of 
a bomb compared to a gun is United States v. Drapeau.145 This case 
involved a defendant charged with the unlawful possession and 
manufacturing of a firebomb.146 The defendant appealed his conviction 
on the grounds that there was no victim involved in making a bomb.147 
However, the court disagreed with this position and held that the making 
and possession of a bomb was a crime of violence, because there are only 
violent objectives that such a bomb can achieve.148 Thus, “by its very 
nature, there is a substantial risk that the bomb would be used against the 
person or property of another.”149 The court compared possession of a 
                                                                                                             
 136 872 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 137 Id. at 773. 
 138 Id. at 774. 
 139 Id. at 777. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See United States v. Cole, No. 93-1344, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3876 (6th Cir. 
Mar. 1, 1994). 
 142 Id. at *7. 
 143 Id. at *8. 
 144 See generally id. (discussing that distinction). 
 145 188 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 146 Id. at 989. A firebomb, also known as an incendiary bomb, is “a bomb that 
contains an incendiary agent (as jellied gasoline) and is designed to kindle fires at its 
objective.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1141 (1981). 
 147 Id. at 990. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. The court was in the realm of the sentencing guidelines in this particular 
analysis. However, the risk of force still applies within § 16(b). 
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bomb with a felon in possession of a firearm: “being a felon-in-
possession of a firearm focuses on society’s determination that certain 
individuals—felons—are unqualified to possess firearms, even for lawful 
purposes. The offense of unlawfully making a bomb, however, focuses 
on the inherent dangerousness of, and lack of a legitimate purpose for, 
the bomb itself.”150 
The previous case notes an important distinction between 
possessing a destructive device and being a felon in possession of a 
firearm. This comment proposes that under the categorical approach of 
possessing a pipe bomb, there is no legitimate or non-violent purpose of 
a pipe bomb; thus, the mere possession of a pipe bomb is a crime of 
violence. This contention is consistent with the distinction that a felon in 
possession of a gun is not always an offense that, by its nature, produces 
a substantial risk that physical force may be used. Since a gun has 
legitimate purposes, courts have to analyze the particular facts of the 
crime charged to determine the use being put forth rather than applying a 
categorical approach. 
In United States v. Lane,151 the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue 
of a felon in possession of a gun and whether or not this was a crime of 
violence. The court recognized that the circuits have split on this issue.152 
The Seventh Circuit decided that this was not a crime of violence 
because there are legitimate and non-violent uses for guns.153 The court 
reasoned that there are some firearms with no legitimate purposes, such 
as sawed-off shotguns and pipe bombs.154 However, the defendant in this 
case was in possession of a firearm with a legitimate purpose.155 “[E]x-
felons have the same motives as lawful possessors of firearms to possess 
a firearm–self-defense, hunting, gun collecting, and target practice.”156 
Possession of a firearm such as these may result in the individual 
committing another, and violent, offense, such as robbing a bank 
at gunpoint, but that doesn’t make the possession offense violent. 
                                                                                                             
 150 Id. at 990 n.4 (citing United States v. Baeza-Suchil, 52 F.3d 898, 900 (10th Cir. 
1995)). It may be argued that this case is distinguishable from Hull, because it involved 
making a bomb rather than the sole possession of the bomb. However, that argument 
would be too narrow. In addition to a charge of possession, Hull was also charged with 
teaching and demonstrating how to make a pipe bomb. Hull, 456 F.3d at 135. 
 151 252 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 152 Id. at 906. 
 153 Id. Defendant here was charged with a statute defining a crime of violence that, 
“by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 
3156(a)(4)(B) (2006). This statutory language serves the same purpose as § 16(b). 
 154 Id. at 907. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Lane, 252 F.3d at 906. 
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Otherwise . . . driving a car without a license is a crime of 
violence because people who commit that offense are likely to 
drive when drunk, or to speed, or drive recklessly or to attempt 
evade arrest. A crime that increases the likelihood of a crime of 
violence need not itself be a crime of violence.157 
It is this further classification within the larger category of firearms that 
supports the assertion that pipe bombs, too, should be a sub-category of 
firearms. 
A similar situation arose in United States v. Bowers.158 The 
defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), (f)(1)(A).159 “A felon in possession has 
committed a crime of violence only if the nature of that offense is such 
that there is a ‘substantial risk’ that he will use ‘physical force’ against 
another ‘in the course of his possession of the weapon.”160 This similarity 
in language to § 16 required the court to proceed in a categorical 
approach to the nature of the crime, not based on the particular facts. The 
court held that a felon in possession of a firearm did not create a 
substantial risk of physical force because the gun could be used for 
legitimate purposes.161 “A substantial risk ‘means a direct relationship 
between the offense and a risk of violence.’”162 The possession of a 
firearm could occur in non-violent circumstances.163 Once again, this sort 
of possession is distinguishable from possessing a pipe bomb, because no 
realistic situation exists where the possession of a pipe bomb could take 
place in non-violent circumstances.164 
One should also consider the notion that pipe bombs and firearms 
are regarded as the favorite weapon of terrorists.165 Recently, these 
devices have evolved into larger car bombs and truck bombs, which no 
                                                                                                             
 157 Id. at 907. 
 158 432 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 159 Id. at 520. Section 3142 defines a crime of violence by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 
3156, which has language that is virtually identical to § 16(b). 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006). 
 160 Bowers, 432 F.3d at 519. 
 161 Id. at 521. 
 162 Id. (quoting United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 163 Id. 
 164 It seems reasonable to suggest that courts finding a felon in possession of a 
legitimate but violent firearm not to be a crime of violence would consider a felon in 
possession of a pipe bomb to be a crime of violence. 
 165 “In the past, we taught our agents and local law enforcement personnel that the 
favorite weapons of the terrorist were pipe bombs and firearms.” Patrick J. Daly, 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Chicago Div., FBI, Testimony before the H. Comm. 
on Governmental Reform, Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt., and 
Intergovernmental Relations: “Counterterrorism” (July 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/daly07022002.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007). 
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longer need a pipe to contain the explosives.166 Under Hull, the 
possession of a truck bomb or even a nuclear bomb would not be a crime 
of violence because, apparently, there is no risk that force would be used 
against another person. 
III. RECKLESSNESS AS A SUFFICIENT MENS REA FOR CRIMES OF 
VIOLENCE 
This Part proposes that a mens rea of reckless conduct should 
suffice as a minimum level of intent for a crime of violence. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Leocal, “[t]his case does not present us with the 
question whether a state or federal offense that requires proof of the 
reckless use of force against a person or property of another qualifies as a 
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.”167 In Leocal, the Court 
specifically stated that negligence or accidental conduct will not 
adequately meet the conditions of § 16, but left open the question as to 
recklessness.168 The Court further specified that § 16(b) “covers offenses 
that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that 
physical force might be used against another in committing an 
offense.”169 This opening has resulted in a split among the circuits with 
respect to whether recklessness is a sufficient level of culpability to 
constitute a crime of violence. 
When faced with this issue, the Hull majority determined that the 
offense of possessing a pipe bomb did not require any force to complete 
the crime; one can obtain the bomb and then simply discard or dispose of 
it.170 However, this interpretation restricts the court from considering the 
natural risks inherent in the offense of possessing a bomb that a 
categorical approach requires.171 The mere possession of a device with a 
capability for a high degree of destruction is a reckless disregard of the 
                                                                                                             
 166 Id. 
 167 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004). 
 168 Id. at 9, 10 (“The key phrase in § 16(a)–the ‘use . . . of physical force against the 
person or property of another’–most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than 
negligent or merely accidental conduct.” “[Section] 16(b) does not thereby encompass all 
negligent misconduct . . . .”). 
 169 Id. at 10. The court clarified that the disregard to risk is not “the general conduct” 
of the person, but that force “might be required in committing a crime.” Id. 
 170 United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 171 The accidental detonation of the bomb would not suffice under Leocal. There must 
be, throughout the possession, a conscious disregard of the risk of force. If one recklessly 
handled a bomb while possessing it, they would not be “actively employing” the bomb, 
but certainly it can be said that the individual was consciously disregarding the risk of 
force. This would be enough of a level of intent to be a crime of violence. Furthermore, 
should courts separate the offense of making a bomb versus possessing it? If one was 
reckless in manufacturing the bomb, would that be enough for a crime of violence, but 
mere reckless possession not be so? This comment says no. 
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risk that force may be used. Because the mens rea of recklessness is 
enough to qualify for a crime of violence, the possession of a pipe bomb 
should be a crime of violence. 
Our criminal justice system generally defines criminal culpability 
by two components: the mens rea—the mental function of the crime—
and the actus reus—the physical portion of the crime.172 “In relatively 
rare circumstances, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he 
performs a voluntary act that causes social harm with a mens rea, a guilty 
mind.”173 With respect to the mens rea component, there are two 
approaches courts may apply in determining the required guilty mind 
necessary for a particular crime: the common law approach and its 
distinction between general and specific intent, and the Model Penal 
Code’s approach, which has five levels of culpability.174 Where a statute 
has not defined the specific mental requirement, judicial bodies are in the 
position to determine the level of culpability required by the 
legislation.175 For example, in the language of § 16, the term “used” 
suggests a minimum threshold of culpability. Therefore, crimes based 
upon strict liability and negligence will not qualify as crimes of 
violence.176 
Most jurisdictions apply the common law system, which consists of 
general intent, specific intent, and strict liability.177 First and foremost, 
strict liability is not an option for a crime of violence as per Leocal.178 
For a crime of violence, general and specific intent remain as options. 
However, these terms do not have specific definitions. General intent 
commonly refers to the intent to commit the underlying act.179 With such 
a loose definition, judges have more room to “flex” the definition of 
general intent.180 General intent includes offenses arising from 
negligence and recklessness.181 On the other hand, specific intent is 
                                                                                                             
 172 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 2001) (“Actus non 
facit reum nisi mens sit rea, or ‘an act doesn’t make [a person] guilty, unless the mind be 
guilty.’”). 
 173 Id. 
 174 Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and 
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 341 (2001). 
 175 Id. at 343. 
 176 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004); see In re Hernandez-Villalobos, No. 
A92-924-547, 2005 WL 1104592 (B.I.A. Jan. 27, 2005) (“According to . . . [Leocal], a 
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a) and 16(b) must involve a higher degree of 
intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.”). 
 177 Batey, supra note 174. 
 178 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 6. Because negligence is an insufficient mens rea, it is implicit 
that strict liability, which does not require a mens rea, is also insufficient. 
 179 DRESSLER, supra note 172, at 136. 
 180 Batey, supra note 174, at 366. 
 181 DRESSLER, supra note 172, at 136. 
638 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:617 
typically the intent as it is written into the statute; the mens rea is easily 
recognizable.182 Where the legislature has not stated any explicit level of 
intent, the courts “generally presume that proof only of ‘general’ rather 
than ‘specific’ intent is required.”183 
When determining the level of intent for possessing a pipe bomb 
under the common law approach, courts would reach a dead end. The 
intent needed to possess a pipe bomb is specific intent as defined in a 
particular statute.184 However, taking a broader view of the crime of 
possession, it may also be construed as a crime of general intent because 
the individual has the mindset to possess a bomb simply to achieve its 
sole purpose of destruction. While support for this position is limited, 
this possession can be analogized to the possession of a large quantity of 
illegal drugs. When an individual is caught in this situation, the law may 
presume that there was an intent to distribute the drugs.185 This conduct 
parallels the possession of a bomb; therefore, courts should apply the 
presumption that the offender will detonate the bomb, the bomb’s sole 
purpose. Viewing possession of a pipe bomb as a general intent crime 
with the mens rea to achieve the purpose of a bomb, the reckless conduct 
of possessing the bomb remains a candidate for a crime of violence.186 
As noticeable from the convoluted argument above, the 
general/specific intent dichotomy is not very workable.187 The Model 
Penal Code attempted to simplify the common law methodology by 
creating five levels of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, 
negligence, and strict liability.188 This comment deals with the faint 
distinction between negligence and recklessness. 
The Code provides definitions for negligence and recklessness.189 
The Code defines “negligence” as when an actor fails to recognize a 
substantial risk of injury to result from the action, and that such actor 
                                                                                                             
 182 A common example of specific intent is the crime of larceny, which requires, as an 
element, the intent to permanently deprive the other person of his property. DRESSLER, 
supra note 172, at 136. 
 183 Batey, supra note 174, at 353 (quoting United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 121 
(2d Cir. 1999)). 
 184 See 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) (2006). 
 185 “Intent to distribute may be inferred from the possession of a quantity of drugs too 
large to be used by the defendant alone.” United States v. Kates, 174 F.3d 580, 582 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 186 Id. 
 187 “[C]ourts[’] us[e of] the common law mens rea methodology does not paint a 
pretty picture, at least not in a governmental system where a purported commitment to 
the principle of legality requires that the legislature define criminal laws in advance of 
their enforcement.” Batey, supra note 174, at 400. 
 188 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
 189 Id. § 2.02(2). 
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should have been aware of such risk.190 In contrast, the definition of 
“recklessness” includes actions where an actor was aware of such a risk 
and chose to disregard it.191 The similarity between these two categories 
has made it difficult for courts to distinguish between them.192 However 
close in degree they may be, it is this slight difference in the degree of 
culpability that separates this mens rea. 
Although a crime of violence may not have a mens rea of 
negligence, crimes of violence are severe enough that a mens rea of 
recklessness should suffice. Furthermore, the possession of a pipe bomb 
is an act that has no legitimate or nonviolent purpose.193 Possessing a 
bomb is not simply failing to perceive a risk. Rather, it is the conscious 
disregard of a substantial risk that force will be used against another.194 
Referring to the previous interpretation that actual use is not required by 
§ 16, this conscious disregard creates such a substantial risk that force 
may be used simply by possessing a bomb.195 
“[W]hen interpreting a statute that is silent with regard to 
culpability, courts employing the Model Penal Code’s mens rea 
methodology should read in a minimum requirement of recklessness”196 
In Park v. INS, the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 
197 The defendant pled guilty to beating a woman to death in a self-
performed exorcism.198 As a result of her alien status, the defendant was 
subject to deportation resulting from her conviction of an aggravated 
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Id. 
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felony.199 The underlying statute defined one example of an aggravated 
felony as a crime of violence defined by § 16.200 The defendant appealed 
the removal proceedings arguing that with a mens rea of recklessness, 
involuntary manslaughter could not stand for a crime of violence.201 The 
Ninth Circuit disagreed.202 Based on binding prior precedent, the court 
declared that involuntary manslaughter was a crime of violence.203 
Reckless conduct was sufficient for a crime of violence.204 The Park 
decision was later reaffirmed in United States v. Ceron-Sanchez.205 
There, the Ninth Circuit held that an aggravated-assault conviction based 
on reckless conduct did qualify as a crime of violence under both prongs 
of § 16.206 Furthermore, in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino,207 the court 
once again confirmed that “recklessness is a sufficient mens rea for a 
crime of violence.”208 The court stated that 
Park’s assertion “that an intentional use of physical force is not 
required” is perfectly compatible with our analysis–the “crime of 
violence” definitions do not require an intentional use of force, 
but they do require a volitional act. To use the language of mens 
rea, the crime need not be committed purposefully or knowingly, 
but it must be committed at least recklessly.209 
This reasoning was also the holding in United States v. Hernandez-
Castellanos.210 In that case, the court agreed with its previous rulings, but 
further stressed that “[f]or a crime based on recklessness to be a crime of 
violence under § 16(b), the crime must require recklessness as to, or 
conscious disregard of, a risk that physical force will be used against 
another, not merely the risk that another might be injured.”211 
These cases exemplify that if recklessness is the base level of intent 
under a statute, then Leocal will not preclude them from qualifying as a 
crime of violence. The methodology employed by these cases is still 
viable, even if some of the holdings may have been overruled, because 
recklessness has not been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Referring 
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back to the issue in this comment, the lack of any non-violent or 
legitimate use of a pipe bomb creates a risk that force will be used 
against another. This risk is then consciously disregarded when 
possessing the bomb. Therefore, the reckless conduct of possessing a 
bomb should suffice as a crime of violence. 
The dissent in United States v. Medina-Anicacio also supports the 
argument that reckless conduct may suffice as a level of intent for a 
crime of violence.212 The dissent in Medina-Anicacio applied a similar 
line of reasoning to the dissent in Hull. In Medina-Anicacio, the 
defendant was an illegal immigrant who had been previously convicted 
of possessing a deadly weapon (an adjustable dagger).213 For the 
purposes of the immigration removal, the majority held that this 
possession was not a crime of violence.214 However, the dissent raised 
numerous arguments against this holding. First, “the only purpose of 
possessing a concealed dagger is the application of ‘physical force . . . 
against the person of another’ when the need arises.”215 This offense, by 
its nature, involves a substantial risk of force and should qualify as a 
crime of violence under § 16(b).216 Second, the possession of a concealed 
dagger “involves more than simple recklessness: it requires [that] the 
offender ‘knowing and intentionally’ carry the concealed dagger.”217 
Third, as with the possession of a pipe bomb, the dissent reasoned that 
the “unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon is an ongoing course of 
conduct,” which remains ongoing until possession ceases.218 “Thus an 
individual continues to commit the offense as long as he holds onto the 
weapon . . . [resulting in] a substantial, continuing risk that offender will” 
use physical force.219 The dissent concluded by noting that “one who 
commits the concealed dagger offense by ‘knowingly and intentionally’ 
carrying a concealed dagger is being more than reckless regarding the 
probability that he will intentionally use physical force in the course of 
his possession of the dagger.”220 
The dissent’s reasoning should be applied to cases involving the 
possession of a pipe bomb. A pipe bomb, like a dagger, is a violent 
instrument with no other purpose than to be forcefully used against 
another. This danger can be contrasted to a non-violent instrument, such 
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as the vehicle in Leocal, to emphasize the point that the possession of an 
item with strictly violent and illegitimate attributes is a conscious 
disregard to a substantial risk of force. Finally, it is argued that the 
majority’s opinion in Medina-Anicacio is inconsistent with plain 
language of § 16(b). “It is unrealistic to conclude . . . that carrying a 
dagger [or possessing a pipe bomb] does not ‘involve[] a substantial risk 
that physical force . . . may be used.”221 The possession of a pipe bomb, 
by its very nature, creates this reckless disregard to such a substantial 
risk.222 
CONCLUSION: RAMIFICATIONS AND PRECEDENT FROM THE HULL CASE 
Simply because the possession of a bomb is distinguishable from 
using a bomb does not remove the substantial risk of physical force 
inherent in possessing a bomb. It appears that the Hull court reached its 
decision based on a technicality within the indictment that failed to state 
Hull would “use” the bomb.223 However, stretching this reasoning to its 
logical extreme will result in regrettable conclusions. In one extreme 
example, a court would have to decline to hold the mere possession of an 
atomic bomb as a crime of violence. The holder(s) would simply argue, 
“Hey, I wasn’t using it. I was just holding on to it.” One can possess a 
bomb and store it in their residence and then argue that these facts do not 
satisfy the “use” requirement. Or, an individual can possess a bomb by 
strapping it to his or her chest, covering it with an overcoat, and walk 
into a building. Depending on the snap-shot of time, instead of the 
continuing offense, the culprit could claim that there was no use of the 
bomb since he or she was only in possession of it. Under the Third 
Circuit’s current interpretation, neither of these scenarios would 
constitute as a crime of violence. Much violence results from car bombs 
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and suicide bombers. Qualifying possession as a crime of violence serves 
as one more tool for defending national security. 
If the defendant accidentally tripped and detonated the bomb, courts 
would fail to term this action a crime of violence, because this conduct is 
negligent conduct as per Leocal. However, by classifying the bomb in a 
category with other objects having no legitimate or non-violent purpose, 
a court could permissibly convict the defendant in this situation for a 
crime of violence. This would be consistent with Leocal and also support 
the reckless conduct as the minimum level of intent. In the international 
struggle against terrorism and other national threats (nations possessing 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, but not actually 
“using” them), the expansion of crimes of violence to include reckless 
conduct is imperative. A crime of violence incorporates a much harsher 
penalty with the intention that this will both specifically and generally 
deter these crimes. 
